Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Fülszöveg

Twenty-five years have passed since the nuclear standoff between Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1962. Although much has been written about the Cuban missile crisis and the lessons that have been or can be learned from it, there remains much that has not been addressed. Raymond L. Garthoff, a Kennedy administration advisor, draws on his recently declassified memoranda and recollection of events, as well as other sources, to reflect on the nature of the crisis, its consequences, and its lessons for the future. Previous memoir accounts, histories, and analyses have concentrated almost entirely on two themes: the dynamics of personalities and politics in American decisionmaking during the crisis, and lessons in crisis management. While some attention has been given to Soviet motivations in placing the missiles in Cuba, there has been no real analysis of the Soviet understanding of the crisis and lessons they may have drawn from the experience. That is a new dimension Garthoff provides in... Tovább

Fülszöveg

Twenty-five years have passed since the nuclear standoff between Khrushchev and Kennedy in 1962. Although much has been written about the Cuban missile crisis and the lessons that have been or can be learned from it, there remains much that has not been addressed. Raymond L. Garthoff, a Kennedy administration advisor, draws on his recently declassified memoranda and recollection of events, as well as other sources, to reflect on the nature of the crisis, its consequences, and its lessons for the future. Previous memoir accounts, histories, and analyses have concentrated almost entirely on two themes: the dynamics of personalities and politics in American decisionmaking during the crisis, and lessons in crisis management. While some attention has been given to Soviet motivations in placing the missiles in Cuba, there has been no real analysis of the Soviet understanding of the crisis and lessons they may have drawn from the experience. That is a new dimension Garthoff provides in this study. Finally, this book examines and reflects on the consequences of the crisis in the subsequent development of U.S.-Soviet relations, in particular during the first year after the crisis, which was also the final year of the Kennedy administration. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis combines an analysis-with new material and new insights-of the origination, unfolding, and consequences of the Cuban missile crisis with the reflections of a participant and the findings of a scholar studying the Soviet view of the crisis and its significance. Raymond L. Garthoff is a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies program at Brookings. A retired career State Department officer, he was executive officer and senior advisor at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from 1969 to 1973 and U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria from 1977 to 1979. Garthoff is the author of Dótente and Confrontation: AmericanSoviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Brookings, 1985), Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration (Brookings, 1984), and Policy versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (Brookings, 1987). Vissza