Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry

Fülszöveg

This book deepens and defends Maclntyre's claim that genuinely rational enquiry requires membership in a particular type of moral community. He offers the most persuasive recent restatement of the Thomist position on the relation of metaphysics to morality.
—Richard Rorty, University of Virginia
. . [Maclntyre] must be the past, present, future and all-time philosophical historians' historian of philosophy."
—The New York Times Book Review
- Also by Alasdair Maclntyre -
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Maclntyre expands his line of reasoning to the concepts of justice and rationality. Despite a rhetoric of consensus, he contends that in our society there remain unresolved fundamental conflicts about what justice requires. Those who look for practical answers to these questions face the problem of radical disagreement on what the rational justification is for acting one way or another.
"Maclntyre has eminently succeeded in doing what is all too rare in our time—he compels... Tovább

Fülszöveg

This book deepens and defends Maclntyre's claim that genuinely rational enquiry requires membership in a particular type of moral community. He offers the most persuasive recent restatement of the Thomist position on the relation of metaphysics to morality.
—Richard Rorty, University of Virginia
. . [Maclntyre] must be the past, present, future and all-time philosophical historians' historian of philosophy."
—The New York Times Book Review
- Also by Alasdair Maclntyre -
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
Maclntyre expands his line of reasoning to the concepts of justice and rationality. Despite a rhetoric of consensus, he contends that in our society there remain unresolved fundamental conflicts about what justice requires. Those who look for practical answers to these questions face the problem of radical disagreement on what the rational justification is for acting one way or another.
"Maclntyre has eminently succeeded in doing what is all too rare in our time—he compels us to rethink the most fundamental moral issues that we face as human beings."—Commonweal
After Virtue
Maclntyre argues that our modern inability to resolve important moral disagreements rationally is rooted in the failures of eighteenth and nineteenth century moral philosophy to achieve its self-set tasks. The only alternative to surrendering to Nietzsche's critique of traditional morality is, so he argues, a return to a Greek and medieval tradition of belief in the virtues, of which Aristotle is the greatest exponent. But can this tradition be rationally defended in the modern world? After Virtue attempts such a defense. Vissza